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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of Marc Champagne’s paper includes the phrase Analytic Philosophy’s 
Arrogation of Argument. Indeed, a main issue, if not the main issue, discussed in the 
paper is the alleged claim by analytic philosophers “that what sets their camp apart from 
long-time rivals is a shared adherence to ‘proper’ norms of argumentation” (p. 2). I 
believe the only named “long-time rivals” are “continental” philosophers. So what are the 
alleged proper norms of argumentation that analytic philosophy has but continental 
philosophy lacks? Champagne identifies many features that are presented as 
distinguishing these two camps, but only some of these can with any plausibility be seen 
as representing norms of argumentation. That is my principal criticism of the paper—it 
seems too wide-ranging. It gives a worthwhile discussion of differences between the 
analytic and continental schools, but the different norms identified are not 
paradigmatically norms of argument. A better case can be made that some are norms of 
argumentation. 
 
2. ANALYTIC VS. CONTINENTAL 
 
Some of the supposedly distinguishing features appear to be nonstarters insofar as they 
merely delineate what it is to be an approach, camp, or school. In discussing how Thomas 
Kuhn’s insights were differently appropriated, Champagne indicates that “the analytic 
world” was impressed with the idea that “dogmatism and willful intellectual closure can 
actually improve the overall institutional strength of a discipline” (p. 5). But surely this is 
just a bit of (slightly Machiavellian) political wisdom that applies to any discipline or 
movement. Another example is Champagne’s fictitious entry for “juxtaposition” in a 
philosophical dictionary. Rather than illustrating the “gratuitous combination of arbitrary 
notions and exploration of ensuing myriad interrelations” (p. 7), the case seems to be 
better understood as illustrating ever increasing refinement of positions on an issue, 
something that could happen in any movement. Think of libertarianism and hard and soft 
determinism, and their variants, for example. 
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Some of the distinguishing features have to do with the content of analytic and 
continental philosophy rather than with its argumentative form, and therefore are also 
nonstarters. Champagne indicates that analytic philosophy is characterized by the 
“piecemeal clarification of linguistic confusions” (p. 5) or (quoting Michael Friedman) 
“an obsession with specific technical problems in the logical or linguistic analysis of 
language,” which are of interest only to “a small circle of narrow specialists” (p. 1). This 
focus is held to be generally to the exclusion of considering the big problems of 
philosophy, the ones that draw ordinary people to philosophy in the first place, such as 
the nature of reality or the meaning of life. These are generally left to the purview of 
continental philosophers (p. 1). 
The candidate distinguishing features that remain, so far as I can see, are as 
follows: 
 
Analytic philosophy is characterized by 
 
(1) “clarity of method” (p. 1) 
 
(2) being “scientifically minded” (p. 1) 
 
(3) “a sustained uniformity in the vocabulary employed” (p. 4) 
 
(4) “cooperative cumulative progress in the formulation and assimilation of 
‘results’” (pp. 1, 4) 
 
(5) “moving forward” but by “quite humble” increments (p. 4) 
 
(6) discipline “professionalization” (p. 4) 
 
 
Continental philosophy is characterized by 
 
(7) “almost willful obscurity more characteristic of a poetic use of language than 
of ostensibly logical argumentative discourse” (p. 1) 
 
(8) “literary intellectuality” (p. 1) 
 
(9) “sophistry” (p. 2) 
 
(10) claims made “not by axioms, definitions, and syllogisms, but by means of 
imagery” (p. 3) 
 
(11) including “barriers of jargon, convolution, and metaphor” (p. 3) 
 
Of course more of the putative features of continental philosophy are phrased from a 
(pretty derogatory) analytic point of view than are the putative analytic features phrased 
from a continental point of view. (About this tendency, Glock says “just as theists should 
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not be allowed to define God into existence, analytical philosophers should not be 
allowed to define themselves into excellence” (2008, p. 211.)) Otherwise, for the most 
part, I have no particular quibble with the accuracy of these attributions. My main 
questions are: Do these features represent norms of argumentation? Do they represent 
norms of argument? 
Many of the features seem to be better described as representing general 
prescriptions of intellectual methodology that need not have anything to do with 
argument per se since they apply to any sort of discourse within the discipline. Consider 
(1) and (2), which, recast as norms, amount to be clear and be scientific. Presumably, one 
can and should obey—even when one is not reasoning toward a conclusion. This can be 
said as well about the remaining characterizations of analytic philosophy, except perhaps 
(6), which seems to represent neither a general methodological prescription nor an 
argumentative norm. 
Regarding the characterizations of continental philosophy, consider the 
prescription(s) that (7) and (10) represent, viz., ‘avoid ostensibly logical argumentative 
discourse’ or ‘avoid axioms, definitions, and syllogisms’. Where ‘argumentation’ is 
understood as concerning the presentation of argument or the action or process of 
arguing, this prescription surely should count as at least a norm of argumentation. It 
seems to basically say ‘avoid formalization in the presentation of your argument’. And 
indeed, one is unlikely to see arguments being formalized in continental philosophy (I 
never have). Not only does formalization of argument appear to be disvalued, the study of 
formalization or symbolic logic is not a subfield of continental philosophy. Of course the 
situation is largely the opposite in analytic philosophy, so this case does appear to 
constitute a genuine and important norm of argumentation with respect to which 
continental and analytic philosophy differ. 
This perhaps interprets the prescription represented by (10) ‘avoid axioms, 
definitions, and syllogisms’, somewhat charitably. I take it that it is not prescribing the 
avoidance of syllogistic reasoning or reasoning from first principles in one’s thinking. I 
hope we all agree that that would be impossible insofar as these are constitutive of what it 
is to reason at all. Rather, I take it that what is being prescribed is the avoidance of 
spelling out the elements of reasoning in an explicit stepwise, and often symbolic, 
fashion.   
The other elements of the continental list (with one exception), like the analytic 
list, seem to represent general prescriptions of intellectual methodology that need not 
have anything to do with argument per se since they apply to any sort of discourse within 
the discipline. Consider, for example, (7)’s ‘be obscure’, which one can do whether one is 
reasoning or not. 
There is, however, the norm of being sophistical represented by (9), which in a 
general sense seems to say that it is all right or desirable to engage in fallacious but 
plausible reasoning. Clearly, this has to do with argument, and not just argumentation. 
But is it a norm of argument? It seems that paradigmatically, norms of argument are far 
more specific; indeed, there seems to be a one-to-one correspondence between, on the 
one hand, positive and negative norms of argument, and on the other hand, valid and 
invalid or (more broadly) cogent and fallacious argument patterns. For example, a 
positive norm of argument would be that denying the consequent or Modus Tollens is a 
permissible pattern of reasoning, and a negative norm of argument would be that it is 
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impermissible to infer that the whole has all of the properties of the parts. If this is right, 
the prescription represented by (9)—be sophistical—is better understood as a meta norm 
of argument or as a statement on the level of generality or vagueness as the claim that 
analytic philosophy has ‘arrogated argument’ or “that what sets their camp apart from 
long-time rivals is a shared adherence to ‘proper’ norms of argumentation.” I conclude, 
then, that Champagne has not given us a single clear case of a norm of argument with 
respect to which continental and analytic philosophy differ. 
Nevertheless, the prescription be sophistical is very suggestive. It does seem that 
not infrequently analytic philosophers charge continental philosophers with mounting 
arguments that are sophistical in a particular way, and sometimes a defense is mounted 
that although the particular approach may differ from usual analytic norms, it is not 
fallacious. This applies almost exclusively to nondeductive reasoning patterns. Perhaps 
the best known case of this is the charge that Nietzsche commits the genetic fallacy in 
some of his writings on ethics, most notably his book, The Genealogy of Morals. A 
definition of the genetic fallacy is reasoning that an idea is objectionable 
(unobjectionable) on the grounds that it has objectionable (unobjectionable) origins. The 
Genealogy of Morals might be summarized as a detailed defense of the claim that 
altruistic values are to be disvalued because of the tainted historical and psychological 
circumstances out of which they grew. As a response to this charge, some defenders of 
Nietzsche predictably argue that he does not quite make the inferential leaps necessary to 
commit the fallacy; with respect to moral or altruistic values, they say his book was 
meant only to “prepare the way for their critique” (Loeb 2008, pp. 9–10). Other defenders 
of Nietzsche take the bull by the horns and argue that no fallacy is committed: Nietzsche 
is adopting and applying an aristocratic or noble standard according to which 
 
questions of value or legitimacy are always decided by an inquiry into family pedigree, lineage, or 
heredity […] Having discovered their ignoble origins, he concludes that altruistic values are “bad” 
in the aristocratic sense—that is base, pitiable and contemptible […] Nietzsche [thereby] finds in 
the genealogical aspect of moral values a relatively given, essential, universal, invariant, and 
unitary determinant of their value. (Loeb 2008, pp. 2, 3, 14)  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
Champagne purports to discuss analytic philosophy’s arrogation of argument from 
continental philosophy. But of the many features that he discusses as distinguishing these 
two approaches, only one clearly represents a norm of argumentation (‘avoid 
formalization’) and none clearly represent norms of argument. However, one feature, 
“sophistry,” is suggestive of norms of argument with respect to which continental and 
analytic philosophy may actually differ. 
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